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REFLECTIONS ON SELF-DETERMINATION
William Burnett Harvey*
By Lee C.
Buchheit. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1978. Pp. xi, 260.
$17.50.
SECESSION: THE LEGITIMACY OF SELF-DETERMINATION.

Today, limited resources, intersecting trade flows, and exposure to the foibles of the great (and less-than-great) powers,
among other causes, produce a human condition that communications technology brings home to all of us. Claims that are more
and more powerful and insistent are asserted, simultaneously, on
behalf of the individual, the group, and the nation, each stressing
the claimants' distinctiveness. Respect for selfhood may w.ell be
essential to individual, group, and national health and wellbeing. Clearly, however, self-awareness and self-assertion also
emphasize differences from other selves; to prevent the dissimilar
from causing abrasions and conflict, open space may be needed
that an increasingly ·crowded world does not easily provide.
Daily the news media illustrate at the national level such
drives and the dangers they create: Quebec separatists win control of the provincial government and demand basic changes in
the Canadian federation; Shaba is invaded by forces opposed to
the distant and "alien" government of Zaire; Britain seeks to
mollify Scottish nationalism by the delegation of greater regional
autonomy. Whether expressed in calm parliamentary debate, in
strident oratory, or with a rifle in a guerilla's hands, the strong
assertions that "we are different," that "it is humiliating to be
ruled by strangers," and that "we are entitled to govern ourselves
and define our own destiny," strike deep responsive chords in
individual, group, and national experience throughout the world.
Simultaneously they can and often do arouse deep-seated fears
of social and political fragmentation.
For better than half a century at least, the separatists' claim
has invoked the "right to self-determination." To a substantial
literature on the subject, Lee C. Buchheit has added a thoughtful
small book that probes the inherent ambiguities of the asserted
right, seeks its philosophical underpinnings and its claim to validation by positive international law, state practice, or juristic
• Professor of Law and Political Science, Boston University. A.B. 1943, Wake Forest
University; J.D. 1948, University of Michigan.-Ed.
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op1mon, and finally proposes a set of standards by which the
legitimacy of a claim to self-determination might, in his view, be
assessed.
Aside from the radical anarchist whose right to selfdetermination-as he asserts it-is highly self-centered, most
who claim the right have a group in view. By reference to what
determinants of shared identity is the group "self' entitled to
determine its political status, to be located on the linear progression from the minimal gathering to vast aggregations? In developed modern societies most individuals are associated with
groups in diverse ways-Democrats, professors, union members
-and each association implies a certain distinctive attribute.
Buchheit sensibly rejects such perceptions of distinct identity
as a basis for asserting a right to self-determination, finding
more plausible "relatively objective, verifiable criteria" such as
religion, history, geography, language, race, and economic activity. He acknowledges, however, the current lack of consensus on
any set of conditions as either necessary or sufficient to define the
self and thereby earn the right of determination. Nor does the
development of such a consensus seem likely. Buchheit quotes Sir
Ivor Jennings' trenchant remark: "On the surface it seemed reasonable: let the people decide. It was in fact ridiculous because
the people cannot decide until somebody decides who are the
people." As with the devotees of Savigny's older romanticism, so
with those like Buchheit who would raise the cry of selfdetermination from the level of political rhetoric to the status of
a norm of international law: uncertainty as to the structural concept of "Volk" or "self' is fundamental and embarrassing.
The murkiness of self-determination raises troublesome
problems at every level of political life and action, but Buchheit
narrows the focus to secession from established states. While a
limited number of "legal" arguments can be marshalled against
recognition of a right to secede (e.g., pacta sunt servanda), it
seems clear that the principal resistance to such recognition does
not rest on law, but on fears of the consequences of undermining
the present units of a precarious international order: consequences implicit in fragmentation into more numerous weak
states which have neither political nor economic viability.
Basically sympathetic to some claims of a right to secede,
Buchheit presses a balanced-and ultimately, I think, unsuccessful-search for a basis for validating that right: in philosophic or
jurisprudential thought, positive international law, state prac-
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tice, and juristic opinion. If secession has a philosophical home,
it lies in the natural law tradition. Yet classic natural law lacked
a mediating structure between the individual and the state.
Grounding a right to secede on aggregated individual rights to
resist oppression interposes no barriers to the ultimate fragmentation-"infinite divisibility"-of the structure of public order.
Before the creation of the United Nations, positive international law lent little if any support to a claimed right of secession.
The impetus that right received from Wilsonian idealism was
rapidly dissipated by the realistic recognition that selfdetermination could not plausibly be limited to those areas where
military defeat provided opportunities for territorial adjustments. With Wilson unable to marshal the support even of his
own advisors, the post-war treaties were silent on selfdetermination. Concern for it survived only in a pattern of treaty
provisions aimed at the protection of minority rights in multiethnic states.
With the creation of the United Nations and the beginning
of the dynamic of decolonization, self-determination again became prominent in international discussion. The United Nations
Charter contains two references, in articles 1(2) and 55, to the
"self-determination of peoplJs." Subsequently, the Assembly's
1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (both adopted by the General Assembly in 1966), and the 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations articulated a principle of self-determination. Nevertheless, profoundly difficult problems remain in ascertaining the parameters
of any resulting norm that validates the right to selfdetermination, particularly if expressed in secession from an established state. In this regard classic decolonization must surely
be treated as a special case. The insistent demands of dependent
peoples, the imperial fatigue of the European colonial powers,
and the opportunism of the Socialist bloc combined to produce
an early consensus, buttressed by state practice keyed to perceptions of national interest, that the peoples of the colonial territories were entitled to throw off their foreign yokes and determine
their political status in the international community. It may well
be, however, tQ.at self-determination as a norm of positive international law largely spent its force in dealing with the classic form
of colonialism. Certainly one should discount the broad language
of some United Nations pronouncements that appear in declara-
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tions specifically addressed to colonialism, especially if one takes
note that the nations created by its demise seem to be entirely
unreceptive to the right in their area. The Organization of African
Unity, for example, has made respect for territorial integrity a
cardinal principle, despite the fact that each state's territory includes diverse peoples-distinguishable often by language, culture, religion, and other factors that might plausibly define a
distinct "self'-some of whom could advance, and indeed have
asserted, a right to self-determination.
Controversy over an asserted riglit to self-determination is
rarely limited to the parent state and the people seeking to
secede. The separatists may seek outside help-moral and material-and affirmative responses from other states may rest on
principle, interest, or both. And the parent state itself may request assistance in suppressing rebellion and separation. This
radiating influence of a separatist effort further complicates any
effort to appraise the proposal by the United Nations of a broadly
stated right to self-determination. The Charter itself does not
speak unequivocally, but antinomically: if self-determination is
a basic principle, so also are nonintervention in the internal affairs of sister states and proscription of the use of force. But surely
assistance to either a parent state in putting down a secession or
to the secessionists in furthering it will involve intervention that
frequently calls for force.
Perhaps the most dramatic illustration of the tension between norms appears in the 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations. Though early paragraphs state broadly the principle of selfdetermination, including specifically the "right to secession,"
paragraphs 7 and 8 reassert the norm of nonintervention and the
values of territorial integrity and of the political unity of sovereign states. Perhaps these divergent norms and values can be
reconciled by conceding a limited license to intervene in aid of a
secessionist effort if the parent state in its internal administration
has infringed "the principle of equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples." If immunity from intervention must
be earned by showing consent of the governed, then relatively few
states in the contemporary world could successfully claim it and
resist the demands for self-determination, even if those demands
caused disintegration and risked provoking violent intervention.
It appears likely that few states would welcome a realistic scrutiny of such a basis for their claim to nonintervention and territorial integrity.
State practice, much more than the lofty rhetoric of United

Jan.-Mar. 1979]

Reflections on Self-Determination

393

Nations debate and declarations, reveals the actual status of the
right to self-determination and specifically of the right to secede.
National rhetoric may obscure reality, however. For example, the
Constitution of the U. S. S. R. explicitly provides for the reservation of "the right freely to secede from the U. S. S. R. ... to
every Union Republic." Soviet spokesmen, citing this commitment, probably have realized significant propaganda gains when
United Nations discussions have turned to Third World claims to
separation from their Western colonial masters. The gap between
Soviet rhetoric and Soviet reality is starkly revealed, however,
when attention is given to the treatment accorded separatist sentiment and action in the Ukraine and Georgia and to the brutal
interventions by Soviet forces in Hungary and Czechoslovakia.
The Chinese have not behaved differently except, recently, to
show greater candor. While the Chinese Communist leaders in
1931 made a "constitutional" commitment to self-determination
and the right of each national minority in China to secede and
form its own independent state, the 1975 Constitution bluntly
asserts that the "People's Republic of China is a unitary multinational State. The areas where regional national autonomy is
exercised are all inalienable parts of the People's Republic of,
China." As noted earlier, the new states of Africa have accorded
primary value to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states
despite, or perhaps because of, the ethnic diversity and centrifugal forces within each of the nations defined by European colonialism. In the United States, despite our revolutionary ancestry
and early recognition that the time may come "for one people to
dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate
and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's
God entitle them," we fought a civil war to establish that there
was no right to secede; nor have we accorded to peoples in other
parts of the world the entitlement we once. claimed for ourselves.
Where we have instigated a foreign secession (Panama), pledged
"respect [to] the right of all people to choose the form of government under which they will live" (Atlantic Charter), or castigated
our Communist adversaries for denying self-determination to the
peoples of the Eastern Bloc satellite nations, we have been guided
by national self-interest rather than by a norm of the international community.
It is surely not surprising that established states should be
reluctant to open the floodgates of. self-determination, thereby
spilling its acid over their own cohesion and even more widely
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over the other national units on which a precarious international
order is grounded. In view of the hazards of fragmentation and
the deep-seated fears these hazards engender, it is perhaps surprising that the international community has been recurrently
willing to articulate a principle of self-determination, however
unclear its scope, and has not labelled all secessions unworthy of
support. Something might be gained, therefore, by formulating
more precisely the criteria of a legitimate secession, so that outside supporters could be praised, not condemned, for their intervention and so that the parent state would have no principled
basis for asking assistance in suppressing the secession. Possibly
also, a state's anticipation of isolation in dealing with its separatists could stimulate its respect for its minorities, their culture,
and their claims to full civic participation.
Buchheit concludes by attempting to define and explicate
the criteria of legitimacy. Adopting a utilitarian perspective with
an avowedly conservative bent (that is, favoring the protection of
existing states), Buchheit proposes to test the legitimacy of secessionist demands by inquiring whether meeting them would increase "the general 'amount' of world harmony." To convert that
general-and fatally vague-test into a usable framework for
discussion and decision, he suggests that two basic factors, each
reflecting the interplay of a number of variables, be considered:
the internal merits of the secessionists' claim and the net increaS'e
in the disruption of the international community that would result from supporting or acquiescing in the claim.
The internal merits of the claim would depend on the distinctiveness of the claimant group; its "selfhood" in terms of cultural,
racial, or historical factors; its occupancy of a distinct territory;
and its viability as a continuing, coherent, independent community. Assessment of the disruption factor would involve balancing (a) the disruption currently existing as a result of unfulfilled aspirations for separation from the parent state and (b) the
disruption that would flow from their fulfillment. Only a significant net increase in disruption would allow the calculator to assess the disruption factor as high. This leads to the curious result
that if the present lot of separatists is disruptive, perhaps because
of violent agitation or either the threat or actuality of third-party
interventions, and if the prospect of the secession's success would
seriously disquiet or upset the international balance, the disruption factor would nevertheless be calculated as "low." This terminological oddity• can be ignored if one keeps in mind that the
calculus is aimed at the net increase of disruption. Disruption
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itself is a multi-faceted concept, involving the effects of both
continued unity and separation on the parent state itself, on other
states closely concerned, and on the general international order
with respect to humanitarian, economic, military, and structural
concerns.
Buchheit illustrates the operation of his analytical framework by considering the successful secession of East Pakistan
(Bangladesh). Despite the area's rather poor prospects for future
economic viability, the distinctiveness of the Bengali majority
would have brought a fairly high rating of the internal merits of
the secessionist claim. On the other hand, the explosive situation
created by secessionist agitation, its brutal suppression by the
Western-controlled Pakistani army, and the dangers implicit in
possible Indian intervention meant that secession and independence would change the form but not greatly increase the scale
of disruption. In any event, whether influenced by these calculations or by other factors, the international community readily
accorded legitimacy to the Bangladesh secession.
A test case for Buchheit's decisional model that is in some
ways more significant than Bangladesh, since it is still topical in
the international community, is Transkei, the first African
"homeland" to be granted independence by South Africa. Following an extended constitutional evolution, the South African Parliament in 1976 granted full legislative competence to the Transkei legislative assembly, which then enacted its own constitution, asserted its sovereign independence, and sought recognition
as a new member of the community of nations. Transkei's international reception has been chilly indeed: only South Africa has
recognized Transkeian independence; its legitimacy has been
denied by the United Nations, which branded its independence
a "sham" and its government a "puppet." Clearly the Transkeian
secession has been deemed illegitimate for an immediately obvious reason: it is regarded as functional, perhaps essential, to the
odious South African policy of apartheid. If the Buchheit model
had structured the international reaction to Transkei, would the
result have been different? My answer can be only impressionistic, since hard data on some of the relevant variables are not
available.
Though Transkeian territory comprises three separate parcels aggregating about 14,887 square miles, the largest, bounded
on the east by the South Indian Ocean, is the traditional homeland of a number of groups speaking dialects of the Xhosa language. While subgroup identities and loyalties probably exist
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among the Xhosa speakers, their language and other cultural
factors provide a common group identity for about ninety-four
percent of the total population. The remainder are primarily
Zulu-Sotho people, with a miniscule representation of whites,
Asians, and persons of mixed descent. Since the majority's selfidentity rests on ethnicity rather than on such transitory factors
as resistance to an external oppressor, group cohesion is likely to
continue and, with it, the at least potential capacity for an independent existence in the political sense. If such capacity has an
economic dimension, any assessment of prospects after secession
becomes much more doubtful. I know of no reliable resource inventory for Transkei. If it has minerals or oil, they are unknown.
The present economy depends almost entirely on subsistence
farming, the earnings of migrant workers in the Republic of South
Africa, and subsidies from the South African government. Despite the negative factors of economic uncertainty and a possibly
vulnerable "trapped minority," the majority's strong ethnic
identity, particularly as counterposed to the alien and oppressive
parent state, leads to a fairly high assessment of the "internal
merits" of Transkei's claim to self-determination.
The Buchheit calculus presents its greatest difficulties when
we turn to the disruption factor. As a starting point, it seems clear
that agitation for Transkeian secession in no way disrupted international harmony: There was no significant terrorist activity; no
troublesome interventions were imminent; and parent-state oppression embraced all of the nonwhite population, not merely
Transkeian secessionists. Indeed, secession as timed and planned
was welcomed by the South African government. If the effects of
actual secession are to be called seriously or even moderately
disruptive, the net increase in disruption would have to be assessed as high, when measured against such a low base line.
What would these effects be? The loss of territory would
exact no prohibitive costs, economic or military, from South Africa. No resource base would be depleted, no trading patterns
disturbed, no new military dangers or defense needs created.
While the birth of a mini-state might be thought disquieting to
the international order itself, the net loss of structural coherence
resulting from the addition of one more tiny polity would be minimal. With respect to such diminutive progeny, the world community already resembled the Old Woman Who Lived in a Shoe.
International concern might be traced to doubt that the new state
would respect human rights and other basic norms of behavior,
but Transkei's anticipated conduct should not have contrasted
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unfavorably with the historic conduct of South Africa. In one
respect, of course, the Transkeian secession might be thought
disruptive of international harmony: It led to a spate of furious
rhetoric and self-righteous resolutions in the United Nations, but
that was hardly new. That rhetoric had long been directed at
South Africa because of its apartheid policy. Finally, threats to
peace through armed intervention do not seem to have been increased by the Transkeian spin-off. Such threats, however remote, have lorig been suggested as an ultimate possibility if South
African racial policy is not changed.
On the calculus thus far developed it may appear in the case
of Transkei that a claim to self-determination whose internal
merits are fairly high should be balanced against a relatively low
net disruption factor, so that the Transkeian claim ·to selfdetermination through secession should have been deemed legitimate. It would be plausible to argue that legitimacy as defined
by a recognized international norm should obligate other nations
to recognize Transkei's independence, accept it into the family of
nations-, and accord it the usual benefits of friendly relations.
Perhaps, however, the calculus presented is too simplistic. In
his own discussion of the disruption factor, Buchheit suggests
that the promotion of general international harmony involves
more than the elimination or reduction of strife, that it involves
"the goal of fostering conditions conducive to social development
and the protection of human dignity." Such a goal is clearly
relevant to the legitimate concern underlying United Nations
hostility toward Transkei and the virtually unanimous denial of
recognition of its independence: a fear that the Transkeian secession, followed by similar actions by Bophuthatswana and other
homelands, would merely protect and strengthen apartheid, with
all its dehumanizing implications and consequences.
From this perspective one may raise the ultimate issue of
ends and means: if international concerns and supportive norms
properly embrace internal "conditions conducive to social development and the protection of human dignity,"_ do the denial of
legitimacy to Transkei's secession and the withholding ofrecognition and normal intercourse best lead to these conditions? The
present international policy maximizes the chances. that Transkei
will remain totally in the dark shadow of South Africa, that its
political and cultural influence will remain undiluted, and that
the material well-being•and freedom of the people of Transkei will
depend almost entirely on the goodwill or self-interest of South
Africa. In short, the denial of Transkeian independence becomes
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a self-fulfilling prophecy. One must recognize, of course, that the
price of human freedom and dignity is often high. If denial of the
right of self-determination to the people of Transkei were a price
that must be paid in order to subvert apartheid and open the
gates of South Africa to racial justice and freedom, that price
might be reasonable indeed. But can one say with any assurance
that the price buys more than another expression of the widespread and intense outrage over South African racial policy?
The Transkei case illustrates both the virtues and the inadequacies of Buchheit's model for testing the legitimacy of secession. Like its remote ancestor, the Benthamite hedonistic calculus, it has a beguiling appearance of objectivity that quickly disappears as one recognizes the dependence of the calculus on the
weighing and measuring of such intangibles as individual and
group perceptions, human aspirations and suffering, and any potential for disruption. Buchheit expressly recognizes this problem
but cannot resist the temptation to present the model in a twoaxis graph, one axis scaled "poor" to "excellent," the other "low"
to "high." If the vectoring of variables to define positions on each
axis depends on judgment, not quantification, the critical problem becomes the identity of the judge, the calculator. Majority
votes in the General Assembly or even in the Security Council
provide no assurance that those votes rest on even a democratized
application of the calculus Buchheit proposes. Rather, the pivotal
datum seems to be national interest assessed by each state before
it casts its vote. Only nationalistic imperatives offer a plausible
basis for understanding and explaining the shifting positions of
individual states and international agencies on secessions thus far
attempted: for example, Soviet support for East Pakistan but
condemnation of Biafra; passionate espousal by the African
states of anti-colonial self-determination but rejection of functionally similar efforts by the Katangese and the Somalis; American laments over eastern Europe but support of Pakistan's effort
to retain Bangladesh and of Zaire's suppression of the Shaba
insurgency. Short of a radical restructuring of the international
order-in both the articulation of norms and the allocation of
power-there is surely not much reason to believe that Buchheit's
legitimacy calculus will induce each nation to discard from its
own calculations those perceptions of its national interest that
influence its judgment in innumerable ways.
Buchheit's decisional model is nevertheless a useful attempt
to clarify thought on the factors that might be adduced in support
of the legitimacy of secessionist self-determination. An interna-
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tional consensus on what those factors are could advise the parties immediately involved as well as sharpen and elevate discussion when political separation-independence-is desired or
demanded. Such gains might be realized short of the development of a norm specifying the respective weights of various factors or of institutions empowered to apply it. As in many lessdeveloped ("primitive") legal orders, norms can contribute to
conflict resolution even in the absence of any expectation that a
particular norm will be directly enforced. The norm still provides
useful reference points for argument and a framework for the
community's appraisal and decision. No winner or loser may
emerge, but a "give-a-little, get-a-little" adjustment aimed at
reconciliation of the disputants and the viability of an <:mgoing
community might. For the international community, such a development in its processes of decision and the objective those
processes seek would be a distinct gain.

